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Evaluating Environmental Policies*
Lori Snyder Bennear and Cary Coglianese

Do environmental policies work? For many, this question may seem simple and
straightforward. To anyone involved in the environmental policy process, it is certainly an
important one. Yet for many environmental policies it lacks a solid answer. Decision makers
often lack carefully collected evidence about what policies have accomplished in the past—and
in this sense they are poorly informed about what new policies might accomplish in the future.
Getting systematic answers to the question of whether environmental policies work is vital. Real
resources are expended on environmental regulatory programs, and at a minimum one should
expect that these programs then lead to improvements in environmental conditions.1 While
intuitions and anecdotes may provide some reason for suspecting that a given policy has made or
will make a difference, the only way to be confident of such suspicions is to evaluate a policy’s
impact in practice. Program evaluation research provides the means to determine what has and
has not worked, and thereby to decide whether to retain existing policies or adopt new or
modified ones.
Academics, policy makers, activists, and business leaders do generally recognize the need
for careful evaluation of existing environmental policies. Indeed, some important research has

*

This paper is forthcoming in Environment and is also based on a report by the authors commissioned by the
National Research Council’s Panel on Social and Behavioral Science Research Priorities in Environmental Decision
Making, copyrighted by the National Academies Press and portions reprinted here with permission. The authors are
grateful for the helpful comments they received from Garry Brewer, Terry Davies, David Heath, Shelley
Metzenbaum, Jennifer Nash, Paul Stern, and two anonymous reviewers.
1
One may want to impose even higher standards on policies, such as expecting that they yield improvements in
environmental quality that more than offset the costs of achieving the improvement or even that they maximize net
benefits, namely they achieve the highest possible difference between the benefits from environmental improvement
and the costs of compliance.
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been undertaken, particularly studies of the effects of long-standing regulations such as the Clean
Air Act and the Clean Water Act. Yet program evaluation research has been remarkably scarce
relative to the overall volume of environmental policy decisions made at the state and federal
level, as well as relative to the amount of evaluation research found in other fields, such as
medicine, education, or transportation safety. A renewed and greatly expanded commitment to
program evaluation of environmental policy would help move environmental decisionmaking
closer to an evidence-based practice.

I. The Role of Program Evaluation in Environmental Policy
To look at this issue closely, it is useful first to define the role that program evaluation
can play in policy deliberation and decisionmaking, distinguishing evaluation from other types of
analysis, including risk assessment, cost-effectiveness analysis, and cost-benefit analysis. While
reliance on these other types of analysis has greatly expanded over the past several decades, most
of these other forms of analysis take place before decisions are made. Relatively little analysis
takes place after decisions have been made and implemented, which is when program evaluation
occurs. Yet anyone who takes analysis and deliberation seriously before decisions are made
should also take seriously the need for research after decisions are made.
Because the overarching purpose behind environmental policies is to improve
environmental conditions—and often thereby to improve human health—program evaluation can
identify whether specific policies are serving this purpose and whether they are having other
kinds of effects, such as reducing environmental inequities, imposing economic costs, or
promoting or inhibiting technological change. In this section, we show how program evaluation
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research fits into the policy process and serves an important role in environmental
decisionmaking.2
A. Environmental Policymaking and Implementation
The policy process begins with the recognition of a potential environmental problem and
a response by the policymaker, often the legislature.3 The response typically takes the form of a
statute imposing requirements on industry or delegating authority to a regulatory agency, such as
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. These
agencies then create additional, more specific regulations or develop other programs to achieve
legislative goals. At the federal level, for example, environmental and natural resources agencies
promulgate hundreds of new regulations each year.
Regulations vary not only in their overall stringency and deadlines for compliance, but
also in terms of the type of policy instrument upon which they rely. For example, technologybased instruments regulate the precise actions that regulated entities must take, while
performance instruments instead compel the achievement of a specified outcome using whatever
technologies or processes regulated entities choose. Performance-based regulation can take the
form of requirements that all facilities achieve uniform outcomes, or they can follow a marketbased approach that allows regulated entities to average or trade in outcomes such as emissions
levels. Alternatively, information-based regulatory instruments require that organizations report
information to the government or the public, while management-based instruments require that

2

The phrase “environmental decisionmaking” here includes all policy decisions related to the environment. While
most of the examples throughout this article draw on federal pollution-oriented environmental policies in the United
States, the discussion applies equally to any type of environmental or natural resources policy decisionmaking, at the
local, state, federal, and international levels.
3
Brewer, Garry and Peter deLeon (1983), The Foundations of Policy Analysis (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey
Press).
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regulated entities develop a planning process or put in place a management system for addressing
regulatory problems.
Policy implementation also involves choices beyond the design of standards. It can
include education, licensing, and grant programs. It also can include the selection of enforcement
or other strategies to ensure compliance with policies. Regulatory agencies must make decisions
about how they will target firms for enforcement: (a) randomly, (b) in reaction to complaints, (c)
based on past history, (d) based on size or other criteria related to the regulatory problem to be
solved, or (e) some combination of these or other factors. Moreover, agency inspectors can be
instructed to approach their work in an adversarial manner—that is, going “by the book” and
issuing citations for any violations found—or in a more cooperative manner that seeks to
encourage regulated entities to solve problems and come into compliance without a heavy use of
punishment.4
Regulatory policies are adopted and then implemented and enforced to change the
behavior of a class of businesses or individuals. The ultimate aim of policymaking and
implementation is to create incentives for individuals and firms to change their behavior in ways
that will solve the problems that motivated the adoption of public policy in the first place. If a
policy works properly, the behavioral change it induces will in turn result in the desired changes
in environmental conditions, public health, or other outcomes. A basic diagram of the
environmental policy process is provided in Figure 1.

4

Bardach, Eugene and Robert A. Kagan (1981), Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press); Scholz, John T. (1984) “Cooperation, Deterrence and the Ecology of
Regulatory Enforcement,” Law & Society Review 18:601; and Hutter, Bridget (1989), “Variations in Regulatory
Enforcement Styles,” Law and Policy 11(2):153-74.
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Figure 1. A simple model of the environmental policy process

B. Prospective Analysis of Environmental Policy
Empirical analysis can usefully inform several stages of the policy process. During the
policymaking and implementation stages, analysis can inform deliberation and decisionmaking
about whether anything should be done to address an environmental problem and, if so, what set
of policy instruments or strategies should be used. Currently, there are several different
analytical methods used extensively during policymaking and implementation, including risk
assessment, cost-effectiveness analysis, and benefit-cost analysis.5 Each type of analysis is used
prospectively to inform the deliberative process leading up to policy decisions.
Risk assessment characterizes the health or ecological risks associated with exposure to
pollution or other hazardous environmental substances or conditions.6 It seeks to identify the
causal relationships between exposure to specific environmental hazards and specific health or
ecological conditions. As such, risk assessment seeks to provide a scientific basis for

5

Stokey, Edith and Richard Zeckhauser (1978), “Project Evaluation: Benefit-Cost Analysis,” in A Primer for Policy
Analysis (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company)
6
National Research Council (1983), Risk Assessment in Federal Government: Managing the Process (Washington,
D.C.: National Academy Press).
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understanding the potential range of benefits that can be attained from policies that aim to reduce
exposure to environmental hazards.7
Benefit-cost analysis seeks to help policymakers identify the benefits and costs of
specific environmental policies and implementation strategies. It compares different policy or
implementation alternatives based on their net benefits—that is, total benefits minus total costs.8
Such analysis is usually conducted in advance of policymaking to try to identify regulatory
options that will be the most efficient.9 As such, benefit-cost analysis usually leads to estimates
of expected net benefits from different alternatives.
Cost-effectiveness analysis seeks to identify the lowest cost means of achieving a specific
goal.10 Unlike benefit-cost analysis, which compares alternatives in terms of both costs and
benefits, cost-effectiveness analysis compares alternatives simply in terms of how much they
cost to achieve a given goal—regardless of whether there will be positive net benefits from
achieving this goal.
EPA’s regulation phasing out lead in gasoline in the 1980s illustrates the respective roles
of risk-assessment, benefit-cost analysis, and cost-effectiveness analysis. Risk assessment helped
demonstrate the connection between lead exposure and cognitive development in children under
the age of six, as well as demonstrated that adults suffer health consequences from lead exposure
through increased blood pressure. Benefit-cost analysis quantified and monetized the benefits of

7

Risk assessment is not exclusively a scientific enterprise, however, as it often involves making certain policy
judgments for which public deliberation may be appropriate. National Research Council (1996), Understanding
Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press).
8
Arrow, Kenneth J., Maureen L. Cropper, George C. Eads, Robert W. Hahn, Lester B. Lave, Roger G. Noll, Paul R.
Portney, Milton Russell, Richard Schmalensee, V. Kerry Smith, and Robert N. Stavins (1996), “Is There a Role For
Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?” Science 272: 221-222.
9
Viscusi, W. Kip (1996), “Regulating the Regulators,” University of Chicago Law Review 63: 1423-1461; and
Hahn, Robert W., (1998) “Government Analysis of the Benefits and Costs of Regulations,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 12(4): 201-210.
10
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of the Administrator (2000), Guidelines for Preparing Economic
Analyses (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Document number EPA 240-R-00-003).
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avoiding the health effects indicated by the risk assessment as well as the costs of complying
with the lead phase-down. In the end, the benefit-cost analysis in this regulatory proceeding
showed benefits in excess of three times the cost of compliance, a finding that encouraged more
rapid implementation of the phase-down rule. Finally cost-effectiveness analysis suggested that
costs of compliance would be greatly reduced if refineries could average their reductions over
time or across facilities, through what was known as the lead trading and banking program.11
As in the lead phase-down regulation, risk assessment and economic analysis of costs and
benefits are typically used prospectively in the regulatory process, to aid legislatures and
regulatory agencies in policy making. The prospective use of these analytic techniques has
expanded greatly in the past 20 years due to 2 developments: evolving professional practices and
executive orders mandating economic analysis under certain conditions. These executive orders,
which call for such analysis preceding the adoption of new federal regulations that are
anticipated to impose $100 million or more in annual compliance costs, have existed under every
administration since Ronald Reagan.12 In the wake of these orders, government agencies have
developed detailed guidance for conducting the required analyses.13

11

For discussion of the role of analysis in the lead phase-down rule, see Nichols, Albert L. “Lead in Gasoline,” in
Morgenstern, Richard D. ed., Economic Analyses at EPA: Assessing Regulatory Impact (Washington, D.C.:
Resources for the Future Press, 1997). For discussion of the lead trading and banking program, see Nussbaum, Barry
D. “Phasing Down Lead in Gasoline in the U.S.: Mandates, Incentives, Trading, and Banking,” in T. Jones and J.
Corfee-Morlot, eds., Climate Change: Designing A Tradable Permit System (Paris, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1992); Hahn, Robert W., and Hester, Gordon L. “Marketable Permits: Lessons for
Theory and Practice,” Ecology Law Quarterly 16(2): 361-406 (1989). For other examples of the use of risk
assessment and benefit-cost analysis in regulatory settings see Morgenstern, Richard D. ed., Economic Analyses at
EPA: Assessing Regulatory Impact (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future Press, 1997); Hahn, Robert W.
ed., Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved (New York, NY: Oxford Press 1996).
12
Coglianese, Cary (2002), “Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law,” University of Illinois Law Review
2002:1111-1137; and Hahn, Robert W. and Cass R. Sunstein (2002), “A New Executive Order for Improving
Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 150: 1489.
13
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of the Administrator (2000), Guidelines for Preparing Economic
Analyses (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Document number EPA 240-R-00-003); and
Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (2003a) “Circular A-4: Regulatory
Analysis,” available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf.
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C. Retrospective Analysis: Program Evaluation of Environmental Policy
In contrast to the prospective use of risk assessment and benefit-cost analysis, program
evaluation occurs retrospectively, as it seeks to determine the impact of a chosen policy or
implementation strategy after it has been adopted.

For example, MIT economist Michael

Greenstone recently evaluated the effect of the Clean Air Act on sulfur dioxide concentrations,
basing his analysis on nearly twenty years of government data collected after the Act was
originally passed.14

Under the Clean Air Act, EPA designated certain counties as “non-

attainment” with respect to ambient air quality standards for SO2. Counties designated as “nonattainment” were subject to more stringent regulations with regard to air pollution than counties
that were designated in “attainment.” The data analyzed by Greenstone showed that sulfur
dioxide concentrations fell more rapidly in non-attainment counties after regulation than in
attainment counties. Did this mean there was a causal connection between the nonattainment
regulations and the observed decline in SO2 concentrations? Using county-level SO2 monitoring
data together with county-level economic data, Greenstone controlled for other factors that may
have been responsible for the decline. Taking these other factors into account, he estimated that
non-attainment status for SO2 was directly responsible for only a small decrease in ambient SO2
concentrations and that this decrease was generally not statistically significant. These more
careful analyses by Greenstone suggest that the Clean Air Act’s system of non-attainment
regulation has had at most only a modest impact on the reductions in sulfur dioxide
concentrations.

14

Greenstone, Michael (2004) “Did the Clean Air Act Cause the Remarkable Decline in Sulfur Dioxide
Concentrations?,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 47:585-611.
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Other regulatory policies have been evaluated retrospectively, including hazardous waste
cleanup laws15 and air pollution and other media-specific environmental regulations.16
Sometimes evaluations show that policies achieve significant results, while at other times they do
not. A variety of innovations in environmental policy have also received retrospective study,
including market-based instruments,17 planning requirements,18 information disclosure
requirements such as EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory (TRI),19 and various voluntary programs
such as EPA’s Project XL and 33/50 program.20 In addition, various procedural policies have

15

Hamilton, James T. and W. Kip Viscusi (1999), Calculating Risks?: The Spatial and Political Dimensions of
Hazardous Waste Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press); and Revesz, Richard L. and Richard B. Stewart, eds. (1995),
Analyzing Superfund: Economics, Science and Law (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future Press).
16
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation (1997), Final Report to Congress on Benefits and
Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Document
number EPA 410-R-97-002); Davies, J. Clarence and Jan Mazurek (1998), Pollution Control in the United States:
Evaluating the System, Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future Press; Harrington, Winston, Richard D.
Morgenstern, and Peter Nelson (2000) “On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates,” Journal of Public Policy
Analysis and Management, 19(2): 297-322; and Chay, Kenneth Y. and Michael Greenstone (2003), “Air Quality,
Infant Mortality and the Clean Air Act of 1970,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Number
w10053.
17
Stavins, Robert N. (1998), “What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Positive and Normative
Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(3): 69-88.
18
Snyder, Lori D. (2004), “Are Management-Based Regulations Effective: Evidence from State Pollution
Prevention Programs,” in Essays on Facility Level Response to Environmental Regulation, Ph.D. dissertation,
Harvard University.
19
Hamilton, James T. (1995), “Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market Reactions to the Toxic Release
Inventory Data,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 28(1): 98-113; Konar, Shameek and Mark
A. Cohen (1997), “Information as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions,”
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 32(2): 109-124; Khanna, Madhu, Wilma Rose H. Quimio,
and Dora Bojilova (1998), “Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool for Environmental Protection,” Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 36(3), 243-266; and Bui, Linda T. M. and Christopher J. Mayer (2003),
“Regulation and Capitalization of Environmental Amenities: Evidence from the Toxics Release Inventory in
Massachusetts,” Review of Economics and Statistics 85(2): 396-708.
20
Blackman, Allen and Janice Mazurek (2000), “The Cost of Developing Site-Specific Environmental Regulations:
Evidence from EPA’s Project XL,” Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 99-35-REV (Washington, D.C.:
Resources for the Future); Marcus, Alfred, Donald A. Geffen, and Ken Sexton (2002), Reinventing Environmental
Regulation: Lessons from Project XL (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future Press); Alberini, Anna and
Kathleen Segerson (2002), “Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve Environmental Quality,” Environmental and
Resource Economics 22: 157-184; Arora, Seema and Timothy N. Cason (1995), “An Experiment in Voluntary
Environmental Regulation: Participation in EPA’s 33/50 Program,” Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 28(3): 271-286; and Khanna, Madhu and Lisa A. Damon (1999), “EPA’s Voluntary 33/50 Program:
Impact on Toxic Releases and Economic Performance of Firms,” Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 37(1): 1-25.
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been subject to retrospective evaluation, such as the use of benefit-cost analysis21 and negotiated
rulemaking.22 Finally, researchers have also evaluated the impact of various types of
enforcement strategies.23
Like the Greenstone study mentioned above,24 such retrospective analyses have sought to
ascertain what outcomes specific governmental policies or strategies have actually achieved.25
Some of these outcomes are the ones the policy was intended to achieve, such as improvements
in human health or the biodiversity of an ecosystem. However, program evaluation research can
also consider other effects, such as whether a policy has had unintended or undesirable
consequences. Has it contributed to other problems similar or related to the one the policy was
supposed to solve? What kinds of costs has the policy imposed? How are the costs and benefits
of the policy distributed across different groups in society? Finally, program evaluation research
can also focus on other outcomes, including transparency, equity, intrusiveness, technological
change, public acceptability, and conflict avoidance, to name a few.
By assessing the performance of environmental policies in terms of various kinds of
outcomes, retrospective evaluation can inform policy deliberations. It becomes a vital part of
21

Morgenstern, Richard, ed. (1997), Economic Analyses at EPA: Assessing Regulatory Impact (Washington, D.C.:
Resources for the Future Press); Farrow, Scott (2000), “Improving Regulatory Performance: Does Executive Office
Oversight Matter?” available at http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/related/oversight.pdf; and Hahn, Robert
and Patrick M. Dudley (2004). “How Well Does the Government Do Cost-Benefit Analysis?” AEI-Brookings Joint
Center on Regulatory Studies Working Paper 04-01.
22
Coglianese, Cary (2001), “Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking,” New York University
Environmental Law Journal 9:386-447; Langbein, Laura and Cornelius Kerwin (2000), “Regulatory Negotiation
versus Conventional Rule Making: Claims, Counterclaims, and Empirical Evidence,” Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory 10:599; Coglianese, Cary (1997), “Assessing Consensus: The Promise and
Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking,” Duke Law Journal 46: 1255-1349.
23
Shimshack, Jay P. and Michael B. Ward (2003) “Enforcement and Environmental Compliance: A Statistical
Analysis of the Pulp and Paper Industry,” mimeo Tufts University; and May, Peter and Soeren Winter (2000),
“Reconsidering Styles of Regulatory Enforcement: Patterns in Danish Agro-Environmental Inspection,” Law and
Policy 22:143.
24
Greenstone, note 14 above.
25
Sometimes program evaluation researchers distinguish between the “outcomes” and “outputs” of a program. For
example, a new enforcement initiative might increase the number of enforcement actions that a regulatory agency
brings (an output), but the program evaluation researcher would want to ask whether this new initiative (and the
corresponding increase in enforcement actions) actually reduced pollution (an outcome).
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what is sometimes called an adaptive management approach to environmental and natural
resources policy.26 Policymakers revisit regulatory standards periodically, whether due to
statutory requirements, industry or environmental group petitions, or a commitment to adaptive
management principles. In addition, existing policies are often used as model solutions for new
environmental problem. For this reason, program evaluation provides critical information for
prospective analysis of new policy initiatives. By knowing what policies have accomplished in
other contexts, prospective analyses—such as benefit-cost analysis—can be grounded in
experience as well as theory and forecasting. The accuracy of the estimation strategies used in
prospective analyses can also be refined by comparing ex-ante estimates with the actual
outcomes discerned through program evaluation research. Figure 2 on page 02 illustrates the role
of program evaluation in the policy process.
Figure 2. Program evaluation in the policy process

26

Holling, C.S., ed. (1978), Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management (London: John Wiley); Lee, Kai
N. (1993), Compass and Gyroscope: Integrating Science and Politics for the Environment (Washington, D.C.:
Island Press); Iles, Alastair T. (1996), “Adaptive Management: Making Environmental Law and Policy more
Dynamic, Experimentalist and Learning,” Environmental and Planning Law Journal 13:288; Clark, William C.
(2002), “Adaptive Management, Heal Thyself,” Environment 44:2.
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II. Methods of Program Evaluation
The goal of program evaluation is to ascertain the causal effect of a program on one or
more outcomes, that is, the change in outcomes that would not have occurred but for the
program. Even if an environmental policy is correlated with a particular environmental or social
outcome, this does not necessarily mean that there is a causal relationship between the policy
initiative and the change in outcomes. By using state-of-the-art evaluation methods, however,
researchers can isolate the effects of specific policy interventions and thereby inform
environmental decisionmaking.
Program evaluation methods aim to identify the causal impact of a treatment on an
outcome or outcomes. In the field of environmental policy, the treatment will often include
government-mandated regulations, such as technology and performance standards,27 marketbased instruments,28 information disclosure policies,29 or management-based policies.30 The
treatment could also consist of a variety of implementation strategies, ranging from different
types of enforcement strategies, grant requirements, or public recognition and waiver programs.31
The treatment could even include international treaties such as the Montreal Protocol or
nongovernmental initiatives, such as trade association self-regulatory efforts like the chemical

27

Coglianese, Cary, Jennifer Nash, and Todd Olmstead (2003), “Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects and
Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation,” Administrative Law Review 55: 741-764.
28
Stavins, Robert N. (2003), “Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments,” in Maler, KarlGoran and Jeffrey R. Vincent eds. Handbook of Environmental Economics, Volume 1 Environmental Degradation
and Institutional Responses (Amsterdam: North-Holland Press).
29
Kleindorfer, Paul, and Eric Orts (1998), “Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks,” Risk Analysis
18:155-70.
30
Coglianese, Cary and David Lazer (2003), “Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to
Achieve Public Goals,” Law and Society Review 37(4): 691-730.
31
For a review of a number of such programs, see Bruijn, Theo de and Vicki Norberg-Bohm (2001), “Voluntary,
Collaborative, and Information-Based Policies: Lessons and Next Steps for Environmental and Energy Policy in the
United States and Europe,” Regulatory Policy Program, Center for Business and Government, RPP Report No. 2 (23
November 1988).
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industry’s Responsible Care program32 or the wood and paper industry’s Sustainable Forestry
Initiative.33
For each treatment to be evaluated, the researcher must obtain reliable measures of
outcomes. Outcome measures used in evaluations of environmental policies can include
measures of facility or firm environmental performance (for example, emissions of pollutants,
energy use); human health impacts (such as days of illness or mortality or morbidity rates); or
overall environmental impacts (such as acres of wetland or ambient air quality). When the
ultimate outcome of concern cannot be directly measured, proxies must be used to assess the
impact of a policy. For example, if one wants to measure the effectiveness of a program designed
to reduce risk from exposure to toxic chemicals, the ultimate outcome of interest would be health
effects from toxics. But measuring the health effects that stem from toxic emissions is
complicated. Toxic emissions translate to different concentrations in the air and water based on
geographic and geologic factors. Exposure to these concentrations varies based on age, activity
levels, and other factors. The health effects of such exposure also can vary with age and current
health status, among other factors. Even though this complexity may sometimes make it
infeasible to measure directly the impact of a program on health, it will often be possible to
assess the impact on some other measurable proxy for health risk, such as toxic emissions or
ambient concentrations.
A. Isolating the Causal Effects of Treatments on Outcomes
The goal of program evaluation is to go beyond simple correlation to estimate the causal
effect of the treatment on the outcomes selected for study. A treatment and outcome may be
correlated, but the treatment can properly be said to be effective only if it has a causal effect on

32
33

See Responsible Care, http://www.responsiblecare-us.com (accessed 12 August 2004).
See Sustainable Forestry Initiative, http://www.aboutsfi.org/core.asp (accessed 12 August 2004).
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the outcome. For example, in his study of non-attainment designations under the Clean Air Act,
Michael Greenstone noted that there was a strong correlation between regulation and subsequent
decreases in sulfur dioxide. Areas that were designated as non-attainment areas experienced
more rapid decreases in sulfur dioxide concentrations than areas that were designated as in
attainment. This correlation, though, proved insufficient to conclude that the Clean Air Act
caused the decline in sulfur dioxide concentrations, as other factors instead accounted for the
observed change.
How can researchers establish a causal link between policies and outcomes? In an ideal
(but completely imaginary) world, the researcher would be able to manipulate policies and
observe resulting outcomes, almost as in a chemistry experiment. For example, ideally the
research would be able to designate a county as “non-attainment,” subject facilities in that county
to more stringent regulations, and observe the sulfur dioxide concentrations that result. Then the
ideal researcher would travel back in time, and replay history only this time the areas would be
designated as “attainment” and facilities would not be subject to the more stringent regulations.
If the researcher could actually observe both sets of outcomes for each county (that is, the level
of sulfur dioxide concentrations in each with and without the non-attainment regulations), then
the causal effect of the program would be a straightforward difference between these
concentration levels.
Of course, the problem of causal inference arises because researchers cannot travel back in
time and reassign counties from non-attainment to attainment and observe the resulting
difference in concentrations. In reality, researchers never observe both potential outcomes for
any given area. At any single point in time, the researcher can only observe the concentration
levels of regulated areas, given that they were regulated, and the pollution levels for
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nonregulated areas, given that they were not regulated. The challenge for program evaluation
researchers is to use observable data to obtain valid estimates of the inherently unobservable
difference in potential outcomes between the treatment and nontreatment (or control) groups.
B. Methods for Drawing Causal Inferences
How can researchers meet this challenge and draw reliable inferences about the causal
effects of environmental policies?34 If possible, the best approach would be to conduct a policy
experiment and rely on random assignment of the treatment. If regulated entities subject to a
treatment are assigned at random, then other factors that determine potential outcomes are also
likely to be randomly distributed between the treatment and the control group. For example, with
random assignment, there should not be systematic differences in the treatment and control
groups in terms of such things as industry characteristics, size of firms, or publicly traded versus
privately held ownership. In the case of random assignment, any differences in outcomes
between the two groups of entities could be attributed to the treatment.
True random experimental designs are rare, if not entirely nonexistent, in environmental
policy. Regulation, voluntary program participation, and other treatments of interest are almost
never randomly assigned. Instead, regulatory status is frequently determined by factors that also
correlate with potential outcomes—such as the size of the facility, the facilities’ pollution levels,
and the age of the facility. For environmental policy analysis, researchers will generally be
forced to use observational study designs, which are also referred to as quasi-experimental

34

A comprehensive answer to the question is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper. For an extensive discussion
of the methods of program evaluation research, see Cook, Thomas D. and Donald T. Campbell (1979), QuasiExperimentation: Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company). For a
thorough treatment of qualitative methods of causal inference, see King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney
Verba (1994), Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). For discussion of the uses of
evaluation methods in the policy process, see Rossi, Peter H. and Howard E. Freeman (1993), Evaluation: A
Systematic Approach, 5th ed. (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications).
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designs.35 Because assignment to treatment is not random in observational studies, and treatment
may be correlated with other determinants of potential outcomes, more sophisticated methods are
required to isolate the causal effect of the treatment.
In observational studies where strict random assignment does not hold, there may be
random assignment conditional on other observable variables. For example, imagine that one
state’s legislature passes a new regulation on hazardous waste while another state’s does not. If
the two states were quite similar—that is, they had the same types of facilities and the same
socioeconomic and demographic variables—then the conditions of random assignment may be
effectively met. If the states are not identical (that is, there are some differences in the types of
facilities or community demographics), then observed differences in environmental performance
across the states may be due to the difference in regulation or to the differences in these other
variables. One state, for instance, may simply have larger or older industrial facilities which will
affect how much hazardous waste they produce.
Variables that are correlated with the treatment and also with outcomes are called
confounders—the presence of these variables confounds researchers’ ability to draw causal
inferences from a simple difference in average outcomes. If the confounders can be quantified
with available data, however, then they are “observable.”36 If all of the confounders are
observable, then the causal effect of regulation could be estimated by examining the difference in
outcomes, conditional on the confounding variables. In our hypothetical two-state example, a
researcher could estimate the causal effect of the treatment by controlling for confounders such
35
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as the size or age of the facilities in both states. The researcher would essentially be comparing
the environmental performance of facilities in the two states that have the same size, age, and
other characteristics related to the generation of hazardous wastes.
Program evaluation researchers find analytic techniques such as regression and matching
estimators to be useful when conditional random assignment holds. Regression analysis
estimates a relationship between the outcome measure and a set of variables that may explain or
be related to the outcome. One of these explanatory variables is the treatment variable, and the
others are the confounders (also called control variables). Regression analysis isolates
statistically the effect of the treatment holding all of the control variables constant.
To illustrate, imagine that Massachusetts passes a new law designed to lower pollution
levels at all electronics plants. Connecticut also has many electronics plants, but these plants are
not subject to the Massachusetts law. Plants in the two states are very similar except that plants
in Massachusetts tend to be larger than plants in Connecticut. A regression of pollution levels on
a variable that designates whether the plant is in Massachusetts and on another variable that
measures plant size will yield an estimate of the effect of the Massachusetts regulation on
pollution levels, holding the size of the plant fixed. If size were to be the only confounder, then
this regression would yield a valid estimate of the causal effect of the Massachusetts regulation
on pollution levels in electronics plants. For example, the Greenstone study seeks to isolate the
causal effect of “non-attainment” status on county-level ambient levels of sulfur dioxide. To
isolate the effect of non-attainment status, Greenstone uses regression analysis and controls for
other variables that may also explain the decrease in sulfur dioxide concentrations including per
capita income, total employment, and total population, among others.
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An alternative statistical technique would be to use a matching estimator. For each
observation that is subject to the treatment (such as an industrial facility subject to a regulation)
the researcher finds a “matching” observation that is not subject to the treatment. To illustrate,
let us return to the hypothetical Massachusetts regulation. To implement a matching estimator in
this case, the researcher would take each facility in Massachusetts and find a facility in
Connecticut of the same size. The researcher would then calculate the difference in pollution
levels for the Massachusetts facility and its matching facility in Connecticut. The average of
these differences for all Massachusetts plants is the average effect of the regulation on pollution.
Finding a “match” is relatively easy when there is only one confounder (size of the plant
in our example). But what if it is important to control not just for size, but also for age of the
facility and socio-economic characteristics of the community, such as the percent employed in
manufacturing, population density, median household income, and so forth? To employ a
matching estimator in this case, for each facility in Massachusetts the research would need to
identify a facility in Connecticut of the same size, age, and with the same socio-economic
characteristics. This may not be possible. This problem is often referred to as the “curse of
dimensionality” because the number of dimensions (characteristics) on which facilities must be
matched is large. One estimation technique that avoids the curse of dimensionality is matching
on the propensity score.37 The propensity score is simply the probability of being treated
conditional on the control variables. Observations are then matched on the basis of their
propensity to receive treatment, rather than on each individual control variable. In his study of
the Clean Air Act, Greenstone also used matching on the propensity score to assess the effect on
non-attainment designations on changes in sulfur dioxide concentrations. He first estimated the
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likelihood that each county would be designated “non-attainment” based on the control variables.
Then counties were matched based on this likelihood of treatment. The average difference
between changes in treated counties’ sulfur dioxide concentrations and the changes in their
corresponding match was the estimated causal effect of the Clean Air Act’s nonattainment
regulations.
Regression and matching estimates assume that all of the confounders are observable.
However, there are frequently cases when there are unobservable factors that are correlated with
the treatment as well as potential outcomes. For example, facilities whose managers have a
strong personal commitment to the environment may be more likely to participate in certain
types of treatment, such as voluntary or so-called “beyond compliance” programs established by
government agencies. However, the managers’ commitment, which will likely be unobservable
to the researcher, is also likely to be correlated with the facility’s environmental performance
regardless of participation in the program.38 When there are unobservable confounders, standard
regression and matching estimators will fail to provide a fully valid estimate of the causal effect
of the treatment. In voluntary programs, for example, an ordinary regression estimate will be
biased because it will be showing not only the effect of the voluntary program but also the effect
of managers’ personal commitment to the environment, without being able to separate the level
of impact of the two causal factors.
In such cases, alternative estimation strategies need to be used. An estimator known as
the differences-in-differences estimator can yield a valid estimate of causal effects if the
unobservable differences between the treated and nontreated entities remain constant over time.
For example, imagine that the researcher has data on two sets of facilities: one set that
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participates in a voluntary environmental program and one that does not. However, these two
sets of facilities do not have identical indicators of environmental performance before the
program is created. In fact, suppose the facilities that participate in the program have, on
average, lower pollution levels even before participation. This is depicted graphically in Figure 3
on page 03. It is clear from the figure that it would be incorrect to characterize the difference in
environmental performance after the program as the causal effect of the regulation, because some
of that difference existed before program came into existence. The differences-in-differences
estimator assumes that, in the absence of treatment, the difference in environmental performance
would have been the same between the two sets of facilities. The dashed line represents the
hypothetical pollution levels of the treatment plants if they never participated in the program.
The causal effect of the program is correctly estimated as the incremental decrease in pollution in
the post-program period, labeled “treatment effect” in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Graphical illustration of the differences-in-differences estimator
Pollution

Actual Performance
of Control Plants

Hypothetical
Performance of
Treatment Plants

Actual
Performance of
Treatment Plants

Treatment Effect
PreTreatment

PostTreatment
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Time

As noted, Figure 3 assumes that the unobservable differences have remained constant
over time, but at times there may be good reason to think that they did not. Similarly, the
differences-in-differences estimator requires data on at least two time periods -- one pretreatment and one post-treatment -- which sometimes do not exist for environmental policies. In
either of these situations, alternative estimation methods will be required.
One frequently used estimation technique in such circumstances is the instrumental
variables method. To illustrate how this method works, return to the example of a voluntary
program where participation is determined, in part, by facility managers’ personal commitment
to the environment, something which we assume is generally unobservable to the researcher. For
sake of illustration, imagine that the regulatory agency administering the voluntary program sent
letters inviting facilities to participate and did so to a completely random sample of facilities.
Further, assume that, on average, facilities that receive the letter are more likely to participate
than facilities that do not receive the letter, but that the correspondence between receipt of the
letter and participation is not perfect. In other words, some facilities that receive the letter do not
participate and some facilities that do not receive a letter nonetheless choose to participate. In
such a circumstance, the participation decision is not randomly assigned and traditional statistical
estimates of the effect of participation on outcome measures will be biased by the unobservable
differences between participants and nonparticipants. What the instrumental variables estimator
would do is capitalize on the fact that the government agency randomly assigned facilities to
receive the invitation letter. In other words, some set of facilities would participate if they
received a letter and would not participate if they did not receive a letter.39 For these facilities
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only, participation would be randomly assigned, because the letters were randomly sent. The
statistical technique of instrumental variables estimation could isolate the effect of participation
for those whose participation decisions were determined by whether they received a letter.
While the preceding discussion only briefly highlights the primary methods for
estimating causal effects, it is clear that these methods are fairly well developed and available for
use in evaluating the impacts of environmental policies. Indeed researchers have already used
these methods to evaluate some environmental policies and programs. Yet other environmental
programs remain significantly under- investigated. It is important to encourage more research
using these kinds of methods so that reliable inferences can be drawn about the causal effects of
environmental policies.
C. Data Availability and Program Evaluation of Environmental Policies
All of the program evaluation methods we have reviewed depend on valid and reliable
data on environmental outcomes and other non-policy determinants of environmental outcomes
(such as economic and technological factors). In other fields of public policy, researchers have
available to them longstanding national surveys such as the Current Population Survey,40 the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth,41 and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.42 For the
most part, these kinds of independent longitudinal data sets have not existed for environmental
program evaluation.

receive a letter). The instrumental variables method provides a valid estimate of the causal effect of the treatment for
compliers. Angrist, Joshua D., Guido W. Imbens, and Donald B. Rubin (1996), “Identification of Causal Effects
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Much of the data collected on environmental performance are built into the regulations
themselves. For example, researchers have data on releases of toxic chemicals available from the
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI); however, these data are available only for facilities that are
subject to TRI regulations and only for the years during which TRI has been in effect. Similarly,
data are reported by regulated facilities on their air emissions, water discharges, and hazardous
waste generation, but these data exist only for the facilities that are regulated under the relevant
statutes and for the years in which the regulations have been in effect. This close connection
between data and regulation necessarily limits researchers’ ability to evaluate the effects of these
regulations as a treatment, because the mandated data are not available for unregulated facilities
(the control group). However, these data can be used to evaluate the impact of other policies
(such as voluntary programs or enforcement strategies) by comparing the outcomes for regulated
firms subject to the treatment with outcomes for other regulated firms not subject to the
treatment.
There are some instances where longitudinal data are available. Yet often these data have
to do with ambient environmental conditions (such as air quality), and it is extremely difficult to
pinpoint the effects of specific policy changes using these indicators. In most cases, it is
impossible to use ambient data to identify the effects on individual firms or facilities.
Researchers seeking longitudinal data on individual facility performance have often used TRI
data because they are readily accessible for many (but by no means all) regulated firms since the
late 1980s. But these data have their limitations too. Most obviously, they do not capture all the
impacts firms have on the environment, as the data only cover releases of certain toxic
pollutants. Furthermore, these data are self-reported, not adjusted for risk, and only reported by
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facilities that exceed the established reporting thresholds. 43 All these factors can affect the valid
use of TRI data as outcome measures for policy evaluation.
Researchers have sometimes used other measures of environmental impacts, such as total
suspended solids levels or biological oxygen demand in water44 or levels of water usage.45
However, obtaining these measures has generally required intensive collection efforts which
have so far limited the use of these data. To a large extent, the future of program evaluation in
environmental policy will therefore be married to the future of environmental reporting and
performance measurement.46 This remains an important area for future research and funding.
III. The Future of Program Evaluation of Environmental Policy
The idea of subjecting policies to program evaluation research is certainly not new. At
about the same time that environmental issues emerged on the federal policy agenda in the 1960s
and early 1970s, the federal government also began to emphasize the use of performance
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evaluations as part of the budgetary process. These early attempts to encourage program
evaluations of government programs certainly have spilled over into the field of environmental
policy from time to time. Yet compared with other types of government programs,
environmental policies have generated relatively little systematic program evaluation research.47
Nevertheless, the present time is an especially ripe one for expanding program evaluation of
environmental policies. Recent developments in policy innovation, government management,
and data availability all contribute to a more conducive climate for expanded program evaluation
on environmental policy issues.
First, numerous environmental policy innovations have been implemented in the past 15
years, and they are now ripe for evaluation. After an initial round of environmental policymaking
in the early 1970s established the main framework for environmental regulation in the United
States, there followed an extended period of concentrated efforts to implement these framework
laws. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, a variety of factors led to a burst of innovative
projects and policies implemented on the federal level and in the states. This later time period
saw the introduction of EPA’s well-known “bubble policy” that allowed facilities to average air
emissions across multiple smokestacks or pipes, the Toxics Release Inventory that required the
disclosure of information on releases of hazardous chemicals, and state pollution prevention laws
that required planning to reduce the use of toxic chemicals. In addition, government has had
considerable experience with a host of innovative, so-called voluntary or partnership programs,
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such as EPA’s Project XL and the Department of Interior’s and National Marine Fisheries
Service’s Habitat Conservation Planning program.
Many of these programs have been in place for a long enough time so that their results
can be estimated through sustained research efforts. Importantly, many of these programs apply
selectively to a subset of all facilities within an industry or sector. Thus, these policies often
make it feasible to compare the behavioral responses of participants and nonparticipants (the
treatment and control groups). Of course, that does not imply that isolating the causal effect of
these policies will be straightforward. The causal effect of voluntary programs is almost always
confounded by differences in facilities that explain the decision to participate in the program in
the first place—so called selection effects which, as discussed above, may include confounding
factors. Some initial efforts are already underway to address these issues,48 but more research on
voluntary programs that takes such selection effects into account would be highly valuable.
The second factor favoring environmental program evaluation at the present time is a
general climate in Washington and state capitals that supports performance evaluation of
government programs. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) requires all
federal agencies to devise specific performance goals and report on their achievement of these
goals using performance measures.49 This focus on performance measures -- rather than on
administrative measures, such as numbers of inspections or numbers of voluntary participants -increases the need for outcome-based evaluation.50 Furthermore, the Office of Management and
Budget has developed the Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) and required that
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government programs begin to use this tool to evaluate whether they are resulting in significant
progress toward public goals.51 Just as executive orders on the ex ante use of economic analysis
for major regulations have given greater prominence to those analytic tools within government
agencies, GPRA and PART may increase demand within environmental and natural resources
agencies for program evaluation research.
Finally, while data limitations remain the greatest barrier to program evaluation in the
environmental field, these data are increasingly available online and agencies are taking other
steps that make it easier to use these data for evaluation research.52 While EPA has collected data
on air emissions, water discharges, hazardous waste generation, and toxics releases for several
decades, in the past these data were collected and maintained separately by the respective
program offices within the agency. As a result, each office generated its own metadata and,
importantly, its own numbering system for identifying facilities. Thus, the same facility was
assigned an AIRS (Aerometric Information Retrieval System) identifier for the air office, a
Permit Compliance System identifier for the water office, and a TRI identifier for the office of
information. Researchers hoping to combine data from more than one source were forced to
match facilities by hand—usually by name and address. Recently, however, EPA has instituted a
common Facility Registry System (FRS) identifier. This identifier has been added to all existing
EPA databases, allowing researchers more easily to match data on a facility from multiple
sources.
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Another recent development that is likely to improve environmental policy evaluation is
EPA’s Risk Assessment Environmental Indicators (RSEI) model. The RSEI model combines
data on toxics releases from TRI with scientific indicators of the effect of these releases on health
risks. By weighting TRI data by risk, RSEI allows researchers to draw inferences about the
health effects of policy interventions. Obviously the value of the RSEI model is married to the
value of the underlying TRI data and the toxicity weights, both of which are open to criticism.
But developing pollution-risk models is an important step in promoting more meaningful risk
measures that can be used for evaluation purposes.
EPA has also expanded data on regulatory compliance. The Integrated Data for
Enforcement Analysis (IDEA), Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO), and
Online Tracking Information System (OTIS) provide researchers with easier access to certain
kinds of data on enforcement and compliance behavior. EPA has gone still further in integrating
enforcement, compliance, and environmental performance data through the Sector Facility
Indexing Project (SFIP). For five industry sectors—automobile assembly, pulp and paper,
petroleum refining, iron and steel production, and metal smelting and refining—SFIP provides
one-stop access to data on the number of inspections, compliance with federal regulations,
enforcement actions, toxic release levels, and spills. The SFIP database also provides
information about the facility, including production capacity and demographic characteristics of
the surrounding area.
While there is much more work to be done to develop and categorize meaningful
metrics,53 recent developments appear headed in a valuable direction for the future of program
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evaluation research.54 Table 1 on page 01 provides information on key types of data currently
available for program evaluation of environmental policies. Improvements in data quality and
data access, combined with the ripeness of a variety of innovative regulatory instruments and the
managerial pressure to evaluate the effectiveness of government programs, suggest that the
coming years could be much more promising for program evaluation research on environmental
policy.
Conclusion
Program evaluation research provides valuable information for policy decisionmaking.
Decision makers in state and federal regulatory agencies, legislatures, and other oversight bodies
(such as OMB) need to design and implement policies that work to achieve public goals. With
information from retrospective evaluations of policies, policymakers will be better able to
determine what policies to adopt (and how to design them) in the future. Policy evaluation
research can also help identify ways to change existing policies to make them more beneficial.
To be sure, when research shows that policies having intuitive appeal do not yield the
anticipated or desired results, some decisionmakers may remain faithful to their intuitions rather
than to what the evidence shows. Resistance to research findings can also occur when actors in
the policy process have interests at stake in certain policies. Although these are real
considerations, it should be noted that the same was (and even still is to a certain extent) true in
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other areas like medicine or education that have more fully adopted principles of evidence-based
decisionmaking. The value of evidence-based practice is only made more compelling when one
acknowledges the strength of the biases that can and do affect decisionmaking.
More program evaluation research should help counteract the skeptical responses to
research in the policy process. If a single study demonstrates that a program is effective or
ineffective, those who are predisposed to think otherwise may be quick to dismiss the findings.
With multiple program evaluation studies on environmental policies, such dismissals will
become more difficult to sustain. If several studies reach consistent results, then over time the
preponderance of the empirical evidence will be more likely to affect the decisions of
policymakers.
Moreover, the reality is that some regulatory officials are receptive to research that can
tell them about what works and what does not work. For example, EPA has recently released a
strategy document on environmental management systems that gives priority to the need for
careful program evaluation of initiatives in this area.55 Consistent with this priority, EPA has
even recently sponsored research efforts on management-based strategies for improving
environmental performance.56
Only with more efforts to give priority to program evaluation research will
decisionmaking over environmental policy be able to become based more on careful deliberation
than on rhetorical and political contestation. It is doubtful that program evaluation research will
end political conflict altogether or immunize policymakers from all error. But it can help sharpen
55
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the focus of policy deliberation as well as inform government’s choices about how to allocate
scarce resources more effectively. Making program evaluation of environmental policy a priority
will be a necessary step toward an evidence-based approach to environmental decisionmaking.
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Table 1. Data Sources for Program Evaluation of Environmental Policy

Topic

Data

Source

Description

Types of Facilities
Covered

Data on Outcomes

Toxics Release
Inventory (TRI)

Contains data on pounds of
chemicals released to air, water,
land, underground injection, and Manufacturing facilities
Self-reported
transferred offsite. Also
that meet certain
by facilities
includes data on pollution
thresholds.
prevention activities and
recycling.

CERCLIS

Contains data on Superfund
sites, including whether they are
on the National Priority List
Superfund sites
(NPL), ownership information,
dates and descriptions of actions
taken.

Record of Decisions
(ROD)

Provides *.pdf files of decisions
Superfund sites
regarding Superfund sites

Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act
Information
(RCRAInfo)

Contains data on hazardous
waste generation for large
quantity generators of
hazardous waste and disposal
information for all treatment,
storage and disposal facilities
(TSDs). Replaces two
previously maintained
databases, the Biennial
Reporting System (BRS) and
the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Information System
(RCRIS).

Toxics and
Hazardous Waste
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Generators of Hazardous
Waste and Hazardous
Waste Treatment Storage
and Disposal Facilities

Table 1 (continued)

Topic

Data

Source

Description

Types of Facilities
Covered

Data on Outcomes (Continued)

Permit
Compliance
System (PCS)
Water

Discharge data is
self-reported by
facilities. Other
Contains data on permit limits,
information
discharge levels, enforcement,
entered and
and inspection activities.
maintained by
either U.S. EPA or
the states.

All National Permit
Discharge and
Elimination System
(NPDES) permit holders

Safe Drinking
Maintained by
Contains data on drinking water
Public drinking water
Water Information U.S. EPA or
contaminant violations and
systems
System
designated states. enforcement actions.

Air

Aerometric
Information
Retrieval
System/AIRS
Facility
Subsystem
(AIRS/AFS)

Self-reported by
facilities

ECHO

Combined
enforcement and Contains data on inspection and Same as underlying PCS,
compliance data compliance for water, air, and AIRS, and RCRAInfo
from PCS, AIRS, hazardous waste permit holders. databases
and RCRAInfo

Integrated Data
for Enforcement
Analysis

Combined
enforcement and Contains data on inspection and Same as underlying PCS,
compliance data compliance for water, air, and AIRS, and RCRAInfo
from PCS, AIRS, hazardous waste permit holders. databases
and RCRAInfo

Contains data on permits,
emissions, inspection, and
compliance with air quality
standards.

All air permit holders

Compliance and
Enforcement
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Table 1 (continued)

Topic

Data

Source

Description

Types of Facilities
Covered

Data on Covariates
Compustat

Publicly held companies.
Standard and Contains income, balance sheet,
Data is available by
Poor's
and cash flow data.
subscription.

Firm Data
Dunn and Bradstreet
Million Dollar
Database

Dunn and Bradstreet
Million Dollar
Database

Dunn and
Bradstreet

Dunn and
Bradstreet

Plant Data
Longitudinal Research U.S. Census
Database
Bureau

Contains data on sales,
employment, industry, and
ownership.

1.6 million U.S. and
Canadian companies,
both private and public.
Data is proprietary and
available by subscription
only.

Contains employment
information at plant and firm
level.

1.6 million U.S. and
Canadian companies,
both private and public.
Data is proprietary and
available by subscription
only.

Contains data from the Census
of Manufacturers and the
Annual Survey of
Manufacturers. Data include
employment, product classes,
and shipments.

Available only by
approved proposal at one
of eight regional data
centers.
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